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Abstract 
Eurozone members are supposedly constrained by the fiscal caps of the Stability and Growth Pact. Yet 
ever since the birth of the euro, members have postponed painful adjustment. Wishful thinking has played 
an important role in this failure.  We find that governments' forecasts are biased in the optimistic 
direction, especially during booms.  Eurozone governments are especially over-optimistic when the 
budget deficit is over the 3% cap at the time the forecasts are made.  Those exceeding this cap 
systematically but falsely forecast a rapid future improvement. The new fiscal compact among the euro 
countries is supposed to make budget rules more binding by putting them into laws and constitutions at 
the national level.  But biased forecasts can defeat budget rules. What is the record in Europe with 
national rules? The bias is less among eurozone countries that have adopted certain rules at the national 
level, particularly creating an independent fiscal institution that provides independent forecasts. 
 
JEL classification numbers:    E62, H50 
 
Keywords: budget, discipline, euro, Europe, eurozone, fiscal, fiscal compact, forecast, independent, 
institutions, Maastricht criteria, optimism, procyclical, rule, Stability and Growth Pact, wishful thinking   2 
 
1. Introduction   
Fiscal rules are increasingly proposed as a means of reining in excessive budget deficits.  
By now it is clear to all that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has failed to keep budget 
deficits and debt levels of eurozone members within the limits specified: originally 3% of GDP 
and 60% of GDP, respectively.  In response to the euro crisis that began in 2010, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has proposed and won acceptance for a new Fiscal Compact among 
the euro states.  The goal of the compact is to strengthen fiscal rules among euro members, in 
particular by writing them into laws and constitutions at the national level. 
In any effort to revise or strengthen fiscal rules, it would help to know why some rules 
have failed in the past, such as the SGP itself, and what the record with national rules of various 
sorts is: limits on spending vs. deficits, conditional or unconditional, with or without independent 
fiscal agencies, and so forth. 
One factor behind excessive budget deficits worldwide is a tendency for official forecasts 
of growth rates, tax receipts, and budget balances to be over-optimistic. It stands to reason that a 
government that foresees, or claims to foresee, healthy surpluses in coming years is less likely 
today to take the difficult steps that might be necessary to strengthen the budget, such as cutting 
spending and raising tax rates. 
The bias toward optimism in fiscal forecasts among the 24 countries included in this 
study is 0.28% of GDP at the one-year horizon, 0.93% of GDP at the two-year horizon, and 
1.90% at the three-year horizon. For the 17 European countries, the bias is even higher, despite 
the rules of the SGP (or perhaps because of them): 0.52% at the one-year horizon, 1.29% at the   3 
two-year horizon and 2.4% at the three-year horizon.
1   An important component of the over-
optimism in official forecasts of the budget deficit is over-optimism in official forecasts of 
GDP.
2 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
Fiscal rules 
Many experts and some elected officials have suggested that annual deficits and long-
term debt can best be held in check through fiscal policy rules or mechanisms such as deficit or 
debt caps.
3  Some countries have already enacted laws along these lines.  The most important and 
most well-known example is the fiscal rules of the eurozone, which supposedly limit budget 
deficits to 3% of GDP and debts to 60% of GDP.
 4    (The Maastricht Treaty specified these fiscal 
rules as criteria for determining what countries are admitted to the eurozone.  The SGP 
supposedly dictated that member countries must continue to meet the criteria.)   Some euro 
countries have enacted budget rules at the national level.   
Other countries have also adopted fiscal rules and other similar institutions.
5   In a recent 
IMF Working Paper, Schaechter, et. al. (2012) create a new database of national and 
supranational fiscal rules across 81 countries from 1985 to 2012.  The authors report that while 
only five countries had fiscal rules in place in 1990, 76 countries had them in place by the end of 
March 2012, most of them purporting to put limits on the deficit or debt.  The success of these 
                                                        
1 The averages are the unweighted averages of each of the country means.  Each country mean receives the same 
weight, even if some countries have more observations.  
2 These findings are documented by Frankel (2011b) and other authors cited in the literature review below. 
3 Anderson and Minarik (2006), Persson and Tabellini (2004), Poterba (1997), Wyplosz (2005), IMF Fiscal Affairs 
Department (2009).   
4 Buti et al. (1998) or Debrun et al (2008).   
5 Alesina et al. (1999), Kopits (2001), Kopits, Symansky (1998), Milesi-Ferretti (2004).      4 
measures, however, depends on making accurate forecasts of government spending and 
revenues.  Getting those forecasts right has proven to be very difficult for most governments.    
 
Research on Official Fiscal Forecasting 
 
Econometric studies have already shown that government budget forecasts in many countries 
are over-optimistic on average, often because official estimates of economic growth are over-
optimistic. 
Auerbach (1994) finds over-optimistic official U.S. forecasts in the decade up to 1993. 
McNees (1995) finds an optimistic bias in official forecasts of long-term American growth 
through 1994.   Auerbach (1999) again finds a tendency for US Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) forecasts to overestimate revenues during the period 1986-93, but found a 
tendency to underestimate revenues during the subsequent period, 1993-99.    McNab, Rider, and 
Wall (2007) find that OMB‟s one-year ahead forecasts of US tax receipts were biased over the 
period 1963-2003 and suggest that the bias may have been strategic on the part of various 
administrations seeking to achieve particular goals, such as overstating budget balance when the 
administration is seeking to increase spending or cut taxes.  Frendreis and Tatalovich (2000) 
show that US administrations (OMB) are less accurate in estimating growth, inflation and 
unemployment than is the independent Congressional Budget Office or the Federal Reserve 
Board.  They find partisan bias, interpreted as Republican administrations over-forecasting 
inflation and Democratic administrations over-forecasting unemployment. 
Forni and Momigliano (2004) find optimism bias among OECD countries in general.  Ashiya 
(2005, 2007) shows that official Japanese growth forecasts are biased upwards and are 
significantly less accurate than private sector forecasts.    According to O‟Neill (2005) and 
Mühleisen et al, (2005), Canada underestimated its budget deficits in the late 1980s and early   5 
1990s, but subsequently overestimated them (1994-2004), perhaps to reduce the risk of missing 
its target of a balanced budget under its strengthened institutional framework. 
Jonung and Larch (2006) find that budget agencies in the EU systematically overestimate the 
economic growth rate.   The tendency toward over-optimistic forecasts is especially strong in 
Italy and Germany.  The United Kingdom is an exception.  Strauch et al. (2009) find a 
statistically significant optimism bias for some euro members:   Germany, Italy, Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal for the period 1991-2004.   The United Kingdom, Finland and 
Sweden, on the other hand, tend to overestimate their deficits.  In light of this difference, it is 
suggestive that the United Kingdom and Sweden were not trying to get into the euro, which 
would have required meeting the fiscal criteria of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, while the others 
were trying to get in, and are now there and thus subject to the SGP.
6    Brück and Stephan 
(2006) explicitly conclude that eurozone governments have manipulated deficit forecasts before 
elections since the introduction of the SGP.  Most of these authors argue that the systematic 
over-optimism in ex ante forecasts translates directly into larger ex post deficits, and particularly 
to deficits larger than targeted under the SGP.    
Similarly, Beetsma et al (2009) find that realized budget balances among SGP countries on 
average fall short of official ex ante plans.   Marinheiro (2010) adds another complete business 
cycle to the data under the SGP, and again finds that the forecasts of European fiscal authorities 
are systematically too optimistic.  This evidence is not consistently strong across the set of 15 
EU countries, but the bias is high for France, Italy and Portugal at all forecast horizons.
7   
Beetsma et al (2011) decompose the overall optimism bias in the budget forecasts of EU 
governments into the component that arises between initial plans and the first release of actual 
                                                        
6 Indeed, Sweden‟s strategy for staying out could have been to feign fiscal imprudence! 
7  He  proposes  delegating  the  macroeconomic  forecasting  to  supranational  authorities,  such  as  the  European 
Commission or the IMF.   6 
budget numbers and the component that arises between the first release and the final revised 
budget numbers.                       
One of the present authors (Frankel, 2011a,b) recently studied forecasts of real growth 
rates and budget balances made by official government agencies in 33 countries.  A number of 
striking findings emerge.  (i) The official forecasts have an upward bias, which is stronger at 
longer horizons.  On average the gap between the forecast of the budget balance and the realized 
balance is 0.2 percent of GDP at the one-year horizon, 0.8 percent at the two-year horizon, and 
1.5 percent at the three-year horizon. (ii) One reason for the optimism bias in official budget 
forecasts is an optimism bias in forecasts of economic growth. The country's growth rate is an 
important determinant of the budget balance at all three time horizons, so over-optimism in 
predicting growth is linked to over-optimism in predicting budget balances. On average, the 
upward bias in growth forecasts is 0.4% when looking one-year ahead, 1.1 percent at the two-
year horizon, and 1.8 percent at three years. (iii) The bias is stronger in booms than in normal 
times.   These findings can help to explain excessive budget deficits, and especially the failure to 
run surpluses during periods of high output: if a boom is expected to last indefinitely, then saving 
for a rainy day is unnecessary. 
Many believe that better fiscal policy can be obtained by means of rules such as ceilings 
for the deficit.  But Frankel (2011a) also finds: (iv) countries subject to a budget rule, in the form 
of euroland‟s Stability and Growth Path, make official forecasts of growth and budget deficits 
that are even more biased and more correlated with booms than do other countries.   This effect 
may help explain frequent violations of the SGP.    
 
   7 
2. Data on Official Budget Forecasts 
The primary data for this paper come from an expanded version of the data set used in 
Frankel (2011a). The data set is composed of the official government forecasts in documents for 
34 countries.
8  Of these we have at least one full decade of budget data for 24 countries. The 
countries with less than a decade of fiscal forecasting data are primarily Central and Eastern 
European countries that only began publicly providing forecasts when they began submitting 
Stability and Convergence Programs to the European Commission in 2005.  These short time 
series are almost entirely concentrated around the period of the global financial crisis, 2008-
2012; we exclude them from the analysis to avoid results that might be driven solely by this 
single unusual historical episode.  
Of the remaining 24 countries, the 17 European countries
9 are the main focus of our 
analysis.  The 7 non-European countries
10  will be used occasionally, as a standard of 
comparison. Beginning in 1999, the data for all European Union countries come from the 
Stability and Convergence Programs that EU members are required to submit annually to the 
European Commission as part of the SGP. Prior to that, forecasts were taken directly from 
national budgets. The sample period varies from country to country due to data availability.  The 
starting date ranges from as early as 1977 (for Chile) to as late at 2002 (for Norway); 1999 is the 
most common starting year for European countries because of the new requirement to 
submit Stability and Convergence programs to the European Commission.  For several 
European countries, such as France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom, forecast data 
from national budgets become available earlier in the 1990s.  The ending date ranges from 
                                                        
8 A list of country coverage can be found in Table A1 of the Online Appendix.  
9 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.   
10 Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States.    8 
2005 (for Switzerland) to 2011 (for 16 countries).  The data set contains not only forecasts of 
the overall budget balance, but also forecasts of real GDP growth, revenues as a percentage of 
GDP, expenditures as a percentage of GDP, and the inflation rate. In the Stability and 
Convergence Programs, EU countries are required to provide forecasts at least three years ahead, 
but the forecasting horizon is often shorter in other countries‟ budget processes. For instance, 
Norway only forecasts its budget balance one-year ahead. Summary statistics on the official 
budget forecasts can be found in Tables A1, A2 and A3 of the Online Appendix.  Information 
on the data sources used throughout the paper can be found in the Data Appendix in the 
Online Appendix.  
The budget balance forecast data used in the analysis are summarized in Table A1 of the 
Online Appendix.  In the table, it can be seen that budget forecast errors exhibit heterogeneous 
patterns across countries.  Figures 1 and 2  plot the mean one and two-year horizon forecast error 
for each of the countries in sample.  The forecast error is defined as forecast budget balance 
minus actual budget balance, so positive numbers indicate over-optimistic forecasts.  In both 
cases, Greece, Ireland and Portugal are the countries that have the most over-optimistic forecasts.  
Figure 3 plots the mean budget balance forecast error by year for European countries.  The figure 
shows that while budget forecast errors were particularly large in the wake of the global financial 
crisis beginning in 2008, budget balances are generally over-optimistic throughout the full 
sample period. Again, the over-optimism increases with the forecast horizon.  Figure 4 plots the 
equivalent figure for real GDP forecast errors for the European countries.   
 
3.  Influences on Official Forecasts   9 
In order to understand the sources of budget forecast errors, it is useful to begin by 
examining how forecasts are affected by macroeconomic variables available contemporaneously, 
that is, at the time the forecasts are made.  To study forecast bias we compare how macro 
variables explain forecast budget balance improvements and actual changes in the budget 
balance.
11  We define the i-year budget balance improvement (BBIt+i) as the change in the budget 
balance (BB) between time t and t+i:  
BBIt+i =BBt+i -BBt  
The forecast budget balance improvement (FBBIt+i) is defined equivalently, with the forecast of 
the year t+i  budget balance replacing BBt+i.  
Here, we limit ourselves to two explanatory variables: the current budget balance (BBt) 
and the output gap (OGt).  To calculate the output gap, log real GDP is HP filtered and the output 
gap is defined as the cyclical component, that is, log GDP minus the trend component  (times 
100).   Table 1 looks only at European countries. We regress Forecast and Actual Budget 
Balance Improvements on the current output gap and budget balance:   
BBIt+i =0+1 BBt +2OGt +t+i . 
The main finding in these regressions is that governments forecast too much mean 
reversion, with 1 strongly negative and significant for forecast improvements but much less so 
for actual improvements.  The magnitude of 1 increases with the forecast horizon. 
In addition, an excess of current output above trend portends a deterioration in the budget 
balance in the subsequent year (presumably due to reversion in output), which is not at all 
captured in the forecast.  We find that these two macroeconomic variables – the current budget 
deficit and output – explain a large fraction of forecast budget balance improvements: for 
                                                        
11 In this paper, we use the revised versions of macroeconomic statistics rather than the statistics that were 
contemporaneously available because of data availability. For analysis of budget forecast errors using real-time data 
see Beetsma et. al. (2009).   10 
European countries the R
2 is 0.41 at the one-year forecast horizon, 0.56 at the two-year forecast 
horizon, and 0.66 at the three-year horizon. While official government forecasts predict that 
deficits will be short-lived, the actual budget balance improvements have much lower 1 
coefficients.   
In Table 2, rather than including just the simple budget balance at the time the forecast 
was made, BBt, we allow the coefficient on the contemporaneous budget balance to differ 
depending on whether the budget is in surplus or deficit.  Defining Surplust as an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 when BBt is greater than or equal to 0, and Deficitt  as an 
indicator variable that takes the value 1 when BBt is less than 0, we run the regression: 
BBIt+i =0+1 Surplust*BBt +2 Deficitt*BBt +3OGt +t+i .    
The key finding is that at the one-year horizon, the coefficient 2 on Deficitt*BBt   is negative and 
very strongly significant, but the coefficient 1 on Surplust*BBt is insignificantly different than 
zero.  In the short-term, we therefore see that countries forecast their deficits will disappear but 
do not similarly forecast the end of their surpluses.   
In column (2), we see that this prediction is qualitatively correct, as large deficits do 
predict budget balance improvements but surpluses do not.  However, the 2 coefficient for the 
forecast improvement is nearly three times as large as for the actual improvements, meaning that 
while deficits tend to be reduced in the short run, they are not reduced as much as they are 
forecast to.  Interestingly, at the two-year horizon, surpluses and deficits are forecast to be nearly 
equally mean-reverting, while at the three-year horizon deficits are forecast to contract more 
quickly than surpluses.  Thus, while government forecasts claim that deficits will be quickly 
eliminated, and this tendency explains a large amount of the variation in their forecasts, in reality 
these measures are poor predictors of the evolution of the budget deficit.     11 
 
3.1 Forecast Errors 
In this section, we focus explicitly on how current macroeconomic conditions relate to 
future forecast errors. We define the i-year ahead budget balance forecast errors BBEt+i as the 
forecast budget balance value minus the actual budget balance.    
BBEt+i =FBBt+i,t -BBt+i  
In the above expression BBEt+i  indicates the realized i-year ahead forecast error, FBBt+i,t 
is the budget balance forecast for period t+i made in period t, and BBt+i  is the realized budget 
balance in period t+i . Much of the remainder of this paper will focus on understanding when 
countries are systematically over-optimistic in their official budget forecasts (a high value of 
BBEt+i). We begin this exercise in the first three columns of Table 3 by seeing whether 
macroeconomic variables known at the time the forecast is made (time t) can predict the size of 
budget forecast errors.  
BBEt+i =0+1 BBt +2OGt +t+i . 
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 we see that large budget deficits at the time a forecast is 
made on average correspond to forecasts that prove to be over-optimistic.  This bias increases 
with the forecast horizon. In addition, we find further support for the conclusion of Frankel 
(2011a) that official forecasts are especially subject to wishful thinking during booms, defined 
here as output being above trend.
12  For European countries, a 1% increase in the output gap at 
the time a forecast is made is associated with a budget forecast that is 0.6% of GDP too 
                                                        
12 Because the output gap is constructed using the HP filter, future data is used in constructing the contemporary 
output gap so these are not true predictive regressions. However, these results are generally robust to replacing the 
output gap with recent GDP growth.     12 
optimistic at the one-year horizon, 1.4% at the two-year horizon, and 1.9% at the three-year 
horizon.    
In Table 4, we once again introduce dummy variables for surpluses and deficits to see if 
surpluses and deficits differentially affect budget forecast errors:  
BBEt+i =0+1 Surplust*BBt +2 Deficitt*BBt +3OGt +t+i . 
We find that at all three horizons, 2  is negatively and strongly significant, confirming that 
countries with larger budget deficits are more over-optimistic in their forecasts.  At the two-year 
horizon, we again find that countries forecast that their surpluses will shrink more quickly than 
they do.
13   
  In Columns (4)-(6) of Table 3, we repeat this exercise for GDP growth forecast errors.  
Defining the real GDP growth forecast error as: 
GDPEt+i =FGDPRt+i,t -GDPRt+i , 
where FGDPRt+i,t is the time t forecast of real GDP growth rate in year t+i, and GDPRt+i is the 
actual real GDP growth rate in period t+i, we regress GDPEt+i  on the contemporaneous output 
gap and budget balance to see if these current variables can explain the forecasting bias.  We 
include the output gap to examine if governments forecast recessions to end quickly and booms 
to continue indefinitely. We include the budget balance to examine the possibility that 
governments may overestimate GDP growth during periods of high deficits so that their budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP is forecast to improve.  As was the case for budget deficits, a 
large positive output gap is a strong predictor of over-optimistic forecasts; booms are 
                                                        
13 We also perform the same exercise for two different subsamples: euro area countries and non-euro area countries. 
Larger current budget deficits are associated with significantly more over-optimistic budget forecasts at all horizons 
over both the 1999-2007 and 1999-2011 time periods for euro area countries.  So the crises of 2008-2011 are not 
driving these results. (Larger budget deficits are only a predictors of over-optimism at the two-year horizon from 
1999-2011 for non-euro area countries). The current output gap is a robust predictor of over-optimistic budget 
forecasts for both euro area and non-euro area countries, over either period. These results are available from the 
authors upon request.   13 
unrealistically extrapolated into the future.  A contemporary budget deficit is a weaker predictor 
of over-optimism and is only significant at the two-year horizon.   Governments predict that 
booms will continue longer than they actually do.  Those countries with budget deficits have a 
tendency to wish them away via future growth prospects.   
 
4. Over-optimism and the Stability and Growth Pact  
Since the previous sections have shown that the contemporaneous output gap OGt  and 
budget balance BBt  explain a large fraction of official forecast over-optimism, we include these 
two variables as controls in all of our subsequent regressions.  We examine how a variety of 
factors, such as the SGP, national fiscal rules or independent budget forecasting institutions 
modify these baseline results.  Because Table 4 suggests that the relationship between the current 
budget balance and over-optimism is stronger for deficits than surpluses, we also conduct all of 
our subsequent analysis using a deficit dummy variable times the size of the budget balance 
(Deficit*BB t).  These results, however, are qualitatively similar to the results using the overall 
budget balance and are therefore relegated to Tables A5, A6, A7, and A8 in the Online 
Appendix.   
Next, we explore how exactly the SGP rules relate to over-optimism in the euro area. 
Because the SGP forbids EU members to exceed a deficit of 3% of GDP we hypothesize that 
governments will be reluctant to forecast breaches of this limit and will instead shade their 
forecasts into the permissible range and then, if necessary, blame their subsequent violation on 
events outside their control. While all signatories of the Maastricht Treaty technically agree to 
abide by the SGP limits on deficits and debt, only euro area countries face the threat of sanctions   14 
for violations (in theory) or political pressure and embarrassment (in practice). We therefore treat 
euro area members as the only countries for whom the SGP limits are relevant.   
  Figure 5 offers visual support for the idea that the SGP makes countries less willing to 
forecast deficits greater than 3% of GDP but not necessarily less likely to violate the limit. In all 
four panels, the vertical line indicates a budget deficit of 3% of GDP. In the upper left-hand 
panel, we see that prior to the global financial crisis, only once did a euro area country forecast a 
violation of the 3% limit at the two-year horizon, yet there is no such discontinuity for actual 
budget deficits (upper right-hand panel). For comparison, we include a similar histogram of two-
year forecasts for countries outside the euro area, and the corresponding realizations in the lower 
right panel. In Table A4, in the Online Appendix, we contrast forecast and actual violations of 
the 3% deficit/GDP limit for euro area and non-euro area countries from 1999-2007. At all 
forecast horizons, euro area countries were less likely to forecast deficits over 3% even though 
they actually violated the limit more frequently.    
  To examine more systematically this idea that countries bound by the SGP try to avoid or 
postpone reprimands by means of over-optimistic forecasts, in Table 5 we begin by regressing 
budget forecast errors on the contemporaneous output gap OGt and a dummy variable for 
membership in the euro area Eurot .
14  We divide Table 5 into two panels, the first for one-year 
ahead forecast errors and the second for two-year ahead forecast errors.  In the first specification 
within each panel we add a dummy variable for euro area membership to the baseline variables 
from Table 3, omitting year fixed effects, and in the second we include year fixed effects.  As 
can be seen in these baseline regressions, controlling for the contemporaneous output gap and 
                                                        
14 Because the large majority of the three-year horizon forecast data we have comes from Stability and Convergence 
Programs, in this section we only look at forecast errors at the one- and two-year horizon to ensure we have 
sufficient observations from countries outside the euro area.    15 
budget balance, membership in the euro area alone is not associated with a statistically 
significant increase in budget forecast over-optimism above and beyond that of other countries.   
In column (3) of Table 5, we introduce interaction terms between euro area membership 
and our baseline variables to examine whether euro area membership modifies our baseline 
results from Table 3. At both the one- and two-year horizons, the coefficient on the interaction 
between euro area membership and the contemporaneous budget balance is strongly negative and 
statistically significant while the magnitude of the coefficient on the budget balance is reduced.  
In other words, we see that the relationship between deficits and over-optimism is stronger for 
euro area countries than for countries outside the euro area.  In the Online Appendix, Table A5 
shows the results are even stronger when we restrict ourselves to  Deficitt*BBt rather than BBt.  In 
that case, an increase in the budget deficit of one percent of GDP is associated with an additional 
0.76% of GDP budget forecast over-optimism for euro area countries at the one-year horizon but 
no impact for countries outside the euro area.  At the two-year horizon the coefficient is -0.68 
and significant, but again statistically insignificantly different from zero for non-euro countries.  
In column (4) of Table 5, we introduce a dummy variable for violations of the excessive 
deficit procedure limit, EDPt, that takes the value 1 if the country's most recent budget deficit 
violates the 3% cap, and an interaction between EDPt, and Eurot..  We also include year fixed 
effects to control for common time-varying shocks t.      
BBEt+i =0+t.+1 OGt +2 BBt +3 EDPt +4 Eurot +5 Eurot *OGt +6 Eurot *EDPt + t+i  . 
  The main result concerns the interaction between the dummy variable for membership in 
the euro area and a violation of the EDP at the time the forecast was made (6). This coefficient 
is large and positive in each specification at the one- and two-year horizons: when euro area 
countries are in violation of the EDP at the time a forecast is made, their one-year forecasts are   16 
biased by over 1.7% of GDP more than non-euro violators of the EDP limit. At the two-year 
horizon, the point estimate is over 2% of GDP. In other words, even controlling for year fixed 
effects, the level of the output gap, a dummy for the common bias coming from deficits larger 
than 3% of GDP, and interaction terms, euro area countries that make their budget forecasts 
while in violation of the deficit limit have forecasts that are 1.7% of GDP more over-optimistic 
at the one-year horizon than non-euro countries exceeding the 3% criterion. At the two-year 
horizon, the effect is even stronger, with euro area countries in violation of the EDP making 
forecast errors over 2% of GDP more over-optimistic than other countries with deficits that 
large.  
  In the final column of each panel of Table 5, we include both Eurot*BBt and Eurot*EDPt.   
The coefficient on  Eurot*EDPt  becomes insignificant at the one-year horizon, and both 
coefficients become insignificant at the two-year horizon. The joint interpretation of the point 
estimates of coefficients is largely the same, however: euro area countries with large deficits 
generally have much more optimistic forecasts than other countries.  These two variables are, of 
course, highly correlated.   
  Next, we construct a new variable EDPGap that measures the size of the violation of the 
three percent limit, to use in place of the dummy variable.
15  The variable is defined as the 
budget balance plus three (BBt+3) if the budget deficit is more than three percent of GDP and 
takes the value of zero otherwise.  In Table 6, we replace the dummy variable EDPt with this new 
variable EDPGap and re-run regressions 4 and 5 of Table 5.  The coefficient on EDPGap in 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 6 (representing the one- and two-year horizons) is significant at the 
one percent level and strongly negative.  As in Table 5, the individual coefficients are harder to 
interpret when the additional interaction between euro area membership and the budget balance 
                                                        
15 We thank an anonymous referee for this helpful suggestion.   17 
is included, but the results are consistent with the conclusion that larger deficits and violations of 
the SGP threshold are associated with significantly more fiscal over-optimism in euro area 
countries.
16  
These results provide an enlightening interpretation of the finding in Frankel (2011a) that 
euro area countries are overall more over-optimistic in their budget deficits. In these regressions, 
euro area forecast errors are comparable to non-euro area forecasts much of the time, but when 
the limits set out in the EDP are breached euro members have very large over-optimistic forecast 
errors.  These findings support the idea that when faced with fiscal rules like the SGP, countries 
find it tempting to adjust their forecasts to meet the criteria, rather than taking the painful actions 
needed to meet the criteria in reality. 
  Our bias estimates are quite large. They reflect in part the fact that these countries were 
hit particularly hard during the 2009 global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the fact that these 
countries missed their forecasts so much more than other countries is important,  especially since 
the year fixed effects take out the mean effect of the financial crisis on government budgets. 
 
5. National Fiscal Rules 
In this section, we examine the impact of national fiscal rules on official forecast errors.   
Even though the eurozone‟s fiscal compact was only agreed in late 2011, many of the members 
already had rules at the national level.  It should be possible to learn from their experience. 
The fiscal constraints of the SGP provide a clear motivation for wishful thinking in the 
forecasts, in order to avoid the political embarrassment of reprimands if not outright sanctions 
from a supranational monitoring authority.  It is not clear a priori if we should expect the same 
                                                        
16 Because the variable  EDPGap is highly collinear with several of the other variables, we prefer the dummy 
variable EDP and will use it in place of EDPGap throughout the rest of the paper.   18 
sort of pattern for national rules.  On the one hand, the country is “grading its own homework.”    
Rather than the sovereign being monitored and disciplined by an external authority removed 
from domestic politics, national fiscal rules are enforced by branches of the same government 
that does the forecasting.  On the other hand, national law and especially national constitutions 
may be more binding than international agreements. 
 
5.1 Fiscal Rule Index 
Before turning to the examination of the impact of different types of fiscal rules on 
budget balance forecast errors, we briefly describe the indices we use to measure the strength of 
national fiscal rules. The underlying data on the classification of these rules come from the 
European Commission's (EC) “Numerical Fiscal Rules in the EU Member States.”
17  The 
database provides the data at varied levels of aggregation. At the finest level, it provides details 
on every individual fiscal rule in each EU member state from 1990 through 2010 (107 individual 
rules). The European Commission classifies each fiscal rule as either a budget balance rule, debt 
rule, expenditure rule, or revenue rule. For each rule, the EC also provides a numerical “Fiscal 
Rule Strength Index” (FRSI). This index is a weighted average of five rule criteria: statutory base 
of the rule, how much room the rule allows in setting or revising objectives, the nature and 
independence of the monitoring and enforcement body, the enforcement mechanisms of the rule, 
and visibility of the rule in the media.
18   
  In order to construct an aggregate Fiscal Rule Index (FRI) for each country, the EC then 
multiplies the FRSI by the fraction of general government finances covered by the rule. If only 
                                                        
17 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm.  
The data on national fiscal rules in Europe were also applied to this problem by Zlatinova and Otto (2012). 
18 The FRSI indices use the random weights method as in Sutherland et. al. (2005).    19 
one rule is in force in a country in a given year, this product of the FRSI and the fraction of 
finances covered is the FRI for the year. If, however, multiple rules apply to the same 
government sector
19, they are ranked by the product of the fraction of government finances they 
cover and their FRSIs;  the strongest rule covering each government sector is given a weight of 
1, the second 1/2, the third 1/3, and so on. These weighted rules
20 are then summed to form the 
FRI. In the EC index, budget balance rules, debt rules, revenue rules, and expenditure rules are 
all treated equally in the construction of the aggregate FRI.  
These types of rules are conceptually different.  Thus, rather than use the composite FRI 
constructed by the EC, which is what Zlatinova and Otto (2012) do, we construct separate FRI's 
for budget balance, debt, expenditure and revenue rules. We follow the same process used by the 
EC in constructing the aggregate index in constructing our four separate indices. We then 
normalize each of the indices to run between 0 and 1. For budget balance rules, the United 
Kingdom‟s budget balance rule in place from 1997 to 2008 achieved the highest score in sample 
and is therefore given the value of one in our index.
21 The budget balance rule index thus runs 
from 0 (no budget balance rule) to rules comparably strong as the United Kingdom‟s “Golden 
Rule.” The countries for which we have data on national fiscal rules and sufficient budget 
forecast data
22 to include in the regressions are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Regression results that include specific national fiscal rules are limited to these 
countries, which are called “EC data set countries” in the regressions.    
                                                        
19 Each rule is classified by the government sector that it covers: the central government, regional governments, 
local governments and social security.  A rule can also be classified as covering multiple sectors or the general 
government.  If one rule covers the general government sector and a second rule covers only certain sectors, the rule 
covering the individual sector is discounted as if it were the second rule covering that specific sector. 
20 The weighted rules are (rule weight) X (coverage of general government finances) X (FRSI).  
21 The so-called “Golden Rule” restricted the general government to borrow only to finance investment rather than 
current spending. 
22 As in the previous sections, we require at least 10 budgets.     20 
  Figure 6 plots the FRI for budget balance rules, revenue rules, expenditure rules, and debt 
rules for all of the countries on which we have data.  
 
5.2 Budget Balance Rules 
Having constructed these indices, we next examine the impact of national budget balance 
rules on budget forecast errors. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, we regress the one- and two-
year budget balance forecast errors on the output gap, budget balance, the budget balance FRI 
(BBR FRIt) and interaction terms between the budget balance FRI and the output gap and budget 
balance.  We find that stronger national budget balance rules are associated with a statistically 
insignificant reduction in the amount of over-optimism in budget forecasts. In addition, neither 
of the interaction terms are significant at the one- or two-year horizon.  Thus, unlike in Table 5, 
we find that the introduction of  national budget balance rules does little to change our baseline 
results from Table 3.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, we mirror the euro area regressions of Table 5 by 
adding a dummy variable for a deficit greater than 3% of GDP (EDPt)  and an interaction 
between this dummy and the budget balance fiscal rule index. Although in Table 5 the dummy 
variable for a 3% cutoff had the interpretation of violating the bounds of the SGP, the national 
budget balance rules do not necessarily have the same numerical target.  We include the same 
dummy variable to keep the estimates in Tables 5 and 7 comparable. The key result from these 
regressions is that whereas euro area countries with deficits larger than 3% of GDP make much 
more over-optimistic forecasts, the effect is reversed when it comes to national budget balance 
rules. Thus, while all countries with budget balances greater than 3% of GDP generally have 
over-optimistic forecasts, this bias is reduced but not eliminated by stronger national fiscal   21 
rules. This effect is in the opposite direction from the case of the supranational SGP, even though 
the 3% level is generally not the target of national budget balance rules. 
 
5.3 Budget Balance Rules and the SGP 
The final issue we address in this section is how exactly national budget balance rules interact 
with the SGP. To examine this question, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 we regress budget 
balance forecast errors on the contemporaneous output gap, budget balance, the budget balance 
fiscal rule index, a dummy for membership in the euro area, an interaction between national 
budget balance rules and euro area membership and year fixed effects:  
BBEt+i =0+t.+1 OGt ..+2 BBt +2 BBR FRIt +3 Eurot +4 BBR FRIt*OGt  
 +5 BBR FRIt*BBt  +6 BBR FRIt*Eurot  +t+i . 
 The main result is that while membership in the euro area is associated with more over-
optimistic budget balance forecasts (albeit statistically insignificantly), this effect is reduced 
when euro area membership is combined with national budget balance rules. Although the direct 
effect of budget balance rules, without conditioning on euro membership, is statistically 
insignificant (Table 7), the results of columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 imply that national fiscal 
rules help reduce over-optimism when counteracting the effect of a supranational rule.  
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 8 attempt to understand more precisely the nature of the success 
of  national fiscal rules at reducing the bias in euro area forecasts.  Since euro area countries are 
more  over-optimistic when they are already in violation of the statutory limit, we examine 
whether national fiscal rules are effective in eliminating this specific bias.  To do so, we look at 
the coefficient on an interaction variable of Eurot*BBR FRIt*EDPt, a dummy variable for 
membership in the euro area, the budget balance FRI, and a dummy variable for violation of the   22 
3% limit.  In columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, we include this interaction along with  Eurot*EDPt , 
a dummy for euro membership, a dummy for violation of the EDP and the output gap.  We find 
that the coefficient on the Eurot*EDPt  variable is large, positive, and significant, confirming the 
earlier result that euro area member forecasts are particularly biased when made at a time when 
the deficit is larger than the 3% cap.  However, this effect is indeed greatly reduced if the country 
has fiscal rules, as seen by the coefficient on Eurot*BBR FRIt*EDPt .   
Based on the point estimates, if a euro country violating the EDP limit were to go from 
having no fiscal rule to adopting a rule as strong as Britain‟s Golden Rule, we estimate that 
forecast bias at the one-year horizon would be no more optimistic than that of a non-euro area 
country that is not in violation of the EDP limit (0.155+0.196+2.725-3.896).   This is also the 
case for the two-year horizon. This is particularly interesting because even non-euro area 
countries have very biased forecasts when they have deficits large enough that they would 
violate the 3% limit (the coefficient on the EDP dummy is over 1).  Therefore, strong fiscal rules 
can counteract not just the bias among euro area countries, but also the bias that other countries 
with comparably large deficits face. In columns 5 and 6 we repeat the analysis of columns 3 and 
4 but include all possible interaction terms of EDP violation, budget balance rules, and euro area 
membership.  The coefficients are nearly unchanged from columns 3 and 4, though the 
individual coefficients lose some significance.  In Table A7 of the Online Appendix, we see the 
results are even more stark when the deficit is used as a covariate rather than the budget balance.   
 
6. Independent fiscal institutions and the SGP 
  In this section, we consider the effect of combining budget balance rules with 
independent government forecasts. As described in Frankel (2011b), the Chilean government has   23 
been successful in combining fiscal rules with a legal requirement to use forecasts of a panel of 
independent experts in the government budget process. The European Commission has a 
database on the role of independent fiscal institutions in the budgetary processes across EU 
member states.
23   Unfortunately it is not possible to create a proper time series as in the case of 
the national budget balance rules.
24 
  For each EU member, if the country has an independent fiscal institution the database 
includes its date of creation, whether the government is required to consult with it during the 
budgetary process, whether it is generally consulted despite the lack of a legal obligation, 
whether it provides an analysis of fiscal policy with or without normative judgment, whether it 
provides independent macroeconomic or budgetary forecasts, how the government is required to 
use its forecasts during the budgetary process, and several other pieces of information.  
  In Table 9 we limit ourselves to using only one dimension of the database: whether a 
country has an independent fiscal institution that provides independent forecasts of the general 
government budget balance. We would have liked to examine the impact of the government 
being legally bound to use these forecasts, as in Chile; but no country in the European Union has 
a legal or constitutional obligation to use the independent forecasts.
25 
  Therefore, we are limited to analyzing the effect that the existence of an independent 
fiscal institution making independent forecasts has on the government's own forecasts. In Table 
                                                        
23 Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/independent_institutions/index_en.htm.  The 
European Commission defines independent fiscal institutions as “non partisan public bodies, other than the central 
bank, government or parliament that prepare macroeconomic forecasts for the budget, monitor fiscal performance 
and/or advise the government on fiscal policy matters.” The EC notes that one of the benefits of these institutions is 
that they “can provide macroeconomic forecasts for the budget preparation that do not suffer from the optimistic 
biases often found in official government forecasts.”     
24 Other than through the dates the independent fiscal institutions were founded, the database does not include 
whether the tasks performed by the institution or its legal position has changed since its inception. Therefore, we 
assume that these characteristics are unchanged since the institutions were created. 
25 In Austria, the government needs to justify publicly deviations from the forecasts of the Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research.   24 
8, IND FBBt  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has an independent fiscal 
institution that provides independent budget balance forecasts at time t.
26  In Columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 9, conditional on the current output gap, budget balance, euro area membership, and 
interaction terms, the forecasting bias is reduced by over 2% of GDP at both horizons in euro 
members when independent fiscal institutions provide independent budget balance forecasts.  
  In columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, we examine whether independent forecasts can be 
helpful in overcoming the tendency of euro area countries to offer more biased budget forecasts 
when they are in violation of the 3% SGP limit. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, we see this is 
in fact the case: although euro area countries violating the EDP at the time a forecast is made 
(Eurot *EDPt )  offer more optimistic forecasts, this bias is reduced for euro area countries 
violating the EDP that have independent budget forecasts (Eurot *Ind FBBt*EDPt ). It is unclear 
why the direct effect of independent forecasts and violations of the EDP (Ind FBBt *EDPt) is so 
strong at the two-year horizon. But even this strong effect is more than reversed by the effect for 
Eurot *Ind FBBt*EDPt . 
The regressions show that euro area governments making forecasts while in violation of 
the EDP with an independent fiscal institution that makes independent budget forecasts have a 
mean bias that is smaller by 2.7% of GDP at the one-year horizon and 2.8% of GDP at the two-
year horizon, compared to a euro area country violating the EDP without such an independent 
fiscal institution.  
The causal interpretation of these results must be qualified:  countries that place a high 
value on the integrity of the forecasts may be less inclined to bias their budget forecasts and may 
                                                        
26 In constructing this variable, we assume that if the independent fiscal institution provides independent forecasts, as 
of 2010, it provided these forecasts since the institution‟s creation.   25 
be more inclined to adopt national fiscal rules or create independent fiscal institutions compared 
to other countries. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Our two most important conclusions can be stated succinctly.  First, euro area countries 
appear to have responded to the 3% limit imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact by 
offering over-optimistic forecasts when they are most in danger of breaching the limit.  
Second, national budget balance rules or independent fiscal institutions that provide their 
own independent forecasts help to reduce this bias.    
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                                                   Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Budget Balance Forecasts and Realizations,, All years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  FBBIt+1  BBIt+1  FBBIt+2  BBIt+2  FBBIt+3  BBIt+3 
             
BBt  -0.289**  -0.0895**  -0.464***  -0.154  -0.582***  -0.127 
  (0.104)  (0.0419)  (0.0645)  (0.111)  (0.0665)  (0.241) 
OGt  0.0743  -0.563***  0.0777  -0.274  -0.0148  1.014*** 
  (0.0906)  (0.107)  (0.101)  (0.235)  (0.0756)  (0.240) 
Constant  -0.0414  -0.269  -0.118  -0.0706  0.317  -0.294** 
  (0.290)  (0.154)  (0.170)  (0.119)  (0.205)  (0.109) 
             
Observations  243  243  210  210  164  164 
R-squared  0.411  0.136  0.562  0.042  0.664  0.047 
Countries  17  17  16  16  15  15 
Year FE  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European countries. 
 
 
Table 2: Budget Balance Forecasts and Realizations, All years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  FBBIt+1  BBIt+1  FBBIt+2  BBIt+2  FBBIt+3  BBIt+3 
             
Surplust*BBt  -0.0647  0.0148  -0.466***  0.0936  -0.452***  0.142 
  (0.0569)  (0.0213)  (0.0643)  (0.206)  (0.0929)  (0.280) 
Deficit*BBt  -0.465***  -0.172***  -0.463***  -0.238  -0.672***  -0.314 
  (0.0930)  (0.0469)  (0.0869)  (0.212)  (0.113)  (0.610) 
OGt  0.101*  -0.550***  0.0780  -0.315  -0.0511  0.938*** 
  (0.0568)  (0.0980)  (0.0948)  (0.276)  (0.0689)  (0.153) 
Constant  -0.749**  -0.598**  -0.116  -0.434  0.0717  -0.805 
  (0.264)  (0.214)  (0.223)  (0.500)  (0.299)  (1.019) 
             
Observations  243  243  210  210  164  164 
R-squared  0.522  0.152  0.562  0.049  0.671  0.051 
Countries  17  17  16  16  15  15 
Year FE  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European countries. 
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Table 3: Errors in Forecasting Budget Balance and Growth 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+3  GDPEt+1  GDPEt+2  GDPEt+3 
             
BBt  -0.199**  -0.346***  -0.401***  -0.0594  -0.161***  -0.124 
  (0.0689)  (0.104)  (0.110)  (0.0450)  (0.0391)  (0.0928) 
OGt  0.637***  1.418***  1.875***  0.947***  1.010***  0.457*** 
  (0.114)  (0.292)  (0.409)  (0.0754)  (0.0878)  (0.146) 
Constant  0.227  0.533**  1.360***  0.303*  0.534***  1.018*** 
  (0.230)  (0.199)  (0.287)  (0.154)  (0.121)  (0.180) 
             
Observations  243  210  164  239  209  164 
R-squared  0.190  0.343  0.368  0.453  0.326  0.055 
Countries  17  16  15  17  16  15 
Year FE  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European countries. 
 
 
Table 4: Errors in Forecasting Budget Balance 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+3 
       
Surplust*BBt  -0.0795  -0.295**  -0.175 
  (0.0573)  (0.108)  (0.171) 
Deficit*BBt  -0.293***  -0.363**  -0.558*** 
  (0.0645)  (0.134)  (0.180) 
OGt  0.651***  1.409***  1.812*** 
  (0.113)  (0.281)  (0.452) 
Constant  -0.150  0.459  0.932** 
  (0.169)  (0.274)  (0.404) 
       
Observations  243  210  164 
R-squared  0.213  0.344  0.374 
Countries  17  16  15 
Year FE  No  No  No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European countries.   30 
 
 
Table 5, Panel 1: The Euro and Budget Balance Forecast Errors, One year ahead 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+1  BBEt+1  BBEt+1  BBEt+1 
           
OGt  0.631***  0.0791  0.142  0.170  0.0828 
  (0.109)  (0.176)  (0.300)  (0.240)  (0.283) 
BBt  -0.197**  -0.215**  -0.0706*  -0.154**  -0.0418** 
  (0.0686)  (0.0773)  (0.0356)  (0.0563)  (0.0188) 
EDPt        0.0320  0.759 
        (0.593)  (0.572) 
Eurot    0.139  -0.167  -0.169  -0.603  -0.231 
  (0.373)  (0.401)  (0.307)  (0.375)  (0.301) 
Eurot*OGt      -0.0882  -0.252  -0.0702 
      (0.177)  (0.190)  (0.185) 
Eurot*EDPt        1.767**  0.202 
        (0.658)  (0.580) 
Eurot*BBt      -0.308***    -0.269*** 
      (0.0608)    (0.0419) 
Constant  0.150  1.110*  1.854***  1.318**  1.719*** 
  (0.286)  (0.629)  (0.550)  (0.501)  (0.490) 
           
Observations  243  243  243  243  243 
R-squared  0.191  0.367  0.434  0.416  0.446 
Year FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European Countries 
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Table 5, Panel 2: The Euro and Budget Balance Forecast Errors, Two years ahead 
  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+2  BBEt+2  BBEt+2  BBEt+2  BBEt+2 
           
OGt  1.398***  0.408  0.107  0.106  0.0194 
  (0.287)  (0.365)  (0.334)  (0.265)  (0.296) 
BBt  -0.345***  -0.401***  -0.206*  -0.233**  -0.127 
  (0.0988)  (0.111)  (0.114)  (0.0903)  (0.137) 
EDPt        0.254  0.833 
        (0.784)  (0.948) 
Eurot    0.893  -0.0485  -0.217  -0.622  -0.514 
  (0.526)  (0.320)  (0.384)  (0.355)  (0.375) 
Eurot*OGt      0.340  0.279  0.373 
      (0.367)  (0.337)  (0.362) 
Eurot*EDPt        2.160*  1.324 
        (1.020)  (1.096) 
Eurot*BBt      -0.288**    -0.155 
      (0.122)    (0.139) 
Constant  -0.0172  0.847  2.370***  2.090**  2.526*** 
  (0.365)  (1.100)  (0.788)  (0.786)  (0.815) 
           
Observations  210  210  210  210  210 
R-squared  0.358  0.503  0.517  0.538  0.540 
Year FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European countries. 
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Table 6:  The Euro and Budget Balance Forecast Errors 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+2 
         
OGt  0.154  0.123  -0.0463  -0.00755 
  (0.306)  (0.303)  (0.317)  (0.314) 
BBt  -0.173**  -0.102**  -0.392***  -0.510*** 
  (0.0801)  (0.0464)  (0.0857)  (0.0871) 
EDPGapt  0.269*  0.170  0.468***  0.608*** 
  (0.140)  (0.119)  (0.105)  (0.122) 
Eurot    -0.338  -0.293  -0.417  -0.423 
  (0.363)  (0.323)  (0.301)  (0.267) 
Eurot*OGt  -0.227  -0.0822  0.291  0.200 
  (0.183)  (0.176)  (0.383)  (0.398) 
Eurot*EDPGapt  -0.509***  -0.192  -0.799***  -1.019*** 
  (0.120)  (0.151)  (0.174)  (0.208) 
Eurot*BBt    -0.260**    0.172 
    (0.0992)    (0.104) 
Constant  2.379**  2.411**  3.472***  3.327*** 
  (1.078)  (1.094)  (0.576)  (0.490) 
         
Observations  243  243  210  210 
R-squared  0.420  0.438  0.539  0.541 
Country FE  No  No  No  No 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: European countries.   33 
 
 
Table 7: National Budget Balance rules of the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+1  BBEt+2 
         
OGt  0.281  0.730  0.258  0.720 
  (0.222)  (0.621)  (0.227)  (0.560) 
BBt  -0.325***  -0.453***  -0.208***  -0.139 
  (0.0820)  (0.135)  (0.0559)  (0.138) 
BBR FRIt  -0.229  -0.112  0.318  0.510 
  (0.475)  (0.608)  (0.298)  (0.421) 
BBR FRIt*OGt  -0.196  -0.748  -0.191  -0.763 
  (0.384)  (0.753)  (0.411)  (0.693) 
BBR FRIt*BBt  0.0348  0.115  -0.137  -0.180 
  (0.109)  (0.198)  (0.119)  (0.237) 
EDPt      1.597*  3.176** 
      (0.858)  (1.093) 
BBR FRIt*EDPt      -2.227*  -3.015* 
      (1.233)  (1.672) 
Constant  -0.617  -0.884  -0.881  -0.483 
  (0.932)  (1.539)  (1.054)  (1.572) 
         
Observations  218  196  218  196 
R-squared  0.419  0.525  0.437  0.558 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes:  EC data set countries.   34 
 
 
 
Table 8: National Budget Balances Rules, the Euro Area and the EDP 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+1  BBEt+2 
             
OGt  0.220  0.693  0.158  0.642  0.143  0.636 
  (0.218)  (0.634)  (0.246)  (0.588)  (0.230)  (0.588) 
BBt  -0.325***  -0.459***  -0.187***  -0.133  -0.198***  -0.139 
  (0.0676)  (0.115)  (0.0513)  (0.140)  (0.0512)  (0.129) 
EDPt      -0.155  1.345  -0.0591  1.359 
      (0.653)  (1.082)  (0.971)  (1.384) 
BBR FRIt  1.258  1.285  0.196  0.271  0.619  0.410 
  (0.982)  (1.320)  (0.399)  (0.764)  (0.680)  (0.834) 
Eurot  1.433  1.218  -0.335  -0.394  0.166  -0.230 
  (0.879)  (1.178)  (0.407)  (0.632)  (0.813)  (1.063) 
BBR FRIt*OGt  -0.148  -0.706  -0.193  -0.772  -0.182  -0.770 
  (0.377)  (0.767)  (0.425)  (0.722)  (0.409)  (0.719) 
BBR FRIt*BBt  0.0565  0.142  -0.144  -0.173  -0.0998  -0.153 
  (0.0668)  (0.160)  (0.102)  (0.202)  (0.101)  (0.197) 
Eurot*BBR FRIt  -2.514*  -2.455      -0.769  -0.239 
  (1.183)  (1.711)      (1.087)  (1.348) 
Eurot*EDPt      2.725**  2.721*  2.428*  2.632 
      (1.041)  (1.450)  (1.176)  (1.680) 
BBR FRIt*EDPt          0.111  0.0764 
          (1.160)  (2.296) 
Eurot*BBR FRIt*EDPt      -3.896**  -5.304**  -3.419*  -5.175* 
      (1.393)  (2.203)  (1.635)  (2.785) 
Constant  -0.608  -0.956  1.120  1.425  0.899  1.334 
  (0.767)  (1.323)  (1.036)  (1.519)  (1.085)  (1.565) 
             
Observations  218  196  218  196  218  196 
R-squared  0.437  0.535  0.467  0.578  0.468  0.578 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes:  EC data set countries.   35 
 
 
 
Table 9: Independent Fiscal Institutions and Forecast Errors 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  BBEt+1  BBEt+2  BBEt+1  BBEt+2 
         
OGt  0.298  0.818  0.202  0.727 
  (0.188)  (0.520)  (0.198)  (0.513) 
BBt  -0.331***  -0.444***  -0.197***  -0.204 
  (0.0512)  (0.113)  (0.0427)  (0.139) 
IND FBBt  0.959*  1.007  0.431  0.403 
  (0.491)  (0.588)  (0.291)  (0.450) 
Eurot  1.240**  1.129  0.174  0.223 
  (0.426)  (0.691)  (0.311)  (0.682) 
IND FBBt*OGt  -0.146  -0.764  -0.0776  -0.703 
  (0.231)  (0.468)  (0.208)  (0.471) 
IND FBBt*BBt  -0.0339  -0.0533  -0.111  -0.0995 
  (0.0653)  (0.135)  (0.0792)  (0.153) 
Eurot* IND FBBt  -2.270***  -2.484**  -1.107*  -1.149 
  (0.682)  (0.863)  (0.537)  (0.752) 
EDPt      0.0201  1.431 
      (0.883)  (1.147) 
Eurot * EDPt      2.332*  1.616 
      (1.112)  (1.614) 
IND FBBt * EDPt      0.540  4.118*** 
      (1.311)  (0.975) 
Eurot* IND FBBt* EDPt      -2.584*  -6.195*** 
      (1.418)  (1.391) 
Constant  -0.686  -0.785  0.823  0.526 
  (0.580)  (1.290)  (0.818)  (1.306) 
         
Observations  218  196  218  196 
R-squared  0.465  0.577  0.497  0.614 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Notes: EC data set countries. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Mean one-year ahead budget forecast errors, European Countries, Full Sample 
Period 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean two-year ahead budget forecast errors, European Countries, Full Sample 
Period 
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Figure 3: Mean Budget Forecast Errors, European Countries, 1995-2011 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean Real GDP Growth Rate Forecast Error, European Countries, 1995-2011 
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Figure 5: Budget balance forecasts and realizations: euro area v. non-euro area pre-2008 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Fiscal Rules in the European Union, 1990-2010 
 
 
 
 